Vivold Consulting
Safety & Ethics

Expanding Project Glasswing

Anthropic widens its frontier-AI cyberdefense program to ~150 organizations across 15+ countries

Key Insights

Anthropic is expanding Project Glasswing - its program giving vetted defenders access to frontier cyber capabilities - from roughly 50 initial partners to about 150 new organizations in 15+ countries, each pending security vetting. The original cohort has already used Claude Mythos Preview to find 10,000+ high- or critical-severity flaws. The expansion adds critical-infrastructure sectors like power, water, healthcare, and communications, and shifts focus toward disclosing and patching vulnerabilities, not just finding them.

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Scaling up the race to secure the world's critical software

Project Glasswing is Anthropic's collaborative push to harden the software that matters most. After starting in April with about 50 partners using Claude Mythos Preview to scan their code, the program is now opening up considerably - roughly 150 new organizations across more than 15 countries, each of which must clear Anthropic's security requirements before getting access.

Who's joining, and why they were chosen

The new cohort deliberately fills gaps in the first one, pulling in sectors like power, water, healthcare, communications, and hardware. Many are vendors - companies and nonprofits maintaining codebases that countless other organizations, governments included, quietly depend on. The common thread is stark: Anthropic estimates that for most of these partners, a successful attack could affect more than 100 million people, with real national- and global-security stakes.

Early results that justify the urgency

The initial partners didn't sit on the tools. Within weeks they were running Mythos Preview at scale and, collectively, have surfaced more than 10,000 high- or critical-severity vulnerabilities - the kind of number that reframes how quickly AI can change defensive cybersecurity.

The bottleneck is shifting from finding to fixing

Here's the strategic pivot: once a model can find vulnerabilities en masse, the hard part becomes verifying, disclosing, and patching them. Anthropic is leaning into that:

  • Partners increasingly use Mythos Preview to write patches and run pre-release checks that stop bugs before they ship.

  • The same models can handle penetration testing, automate threat detection and response, and rebuild legacy code in memory-safe languages.

  • Anthropic is in talks with third parties about scaling up review and patching of open-source software, and about making vulnerability disclosures easier for maintainers to act on.

It also recently shipped Claude Security, a product using public models like Opus 4.8 to scan codebases and suggest patches, and is releasing some of its internal vulnerability-finding tooling to trusted teams on request.

The bigger warning

Anthropic frames all of this against a ticking clock: within 6-12 months it expects other labs to have Mythos-class models, some possibly released without safeguards. In that world, attacks could become more frequent and unpredictable. The point of Glasswing, then, is to nudge institutions toward new operating norms now - and, if it works, to hand defenders a durable, permanent edge before the offensive capabilities go mainstream.

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